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Abstract
The question of transparency is widely regarded as a thermometer of the relation between the Council of the EU and the
public at large. Relatively little attention however has been devoted to the implications of transparency (i.e., access for the
general public) for inter-institutional information politics, even when the limited evidence suggests that the connection is
considerable. This article asks how EU actors use Council transparency as a platform and for what reason. It approaches
transparency as a policy that is developed in three arenas: the internal, the external political, and the external judicial
arena. The article finds strong evidence in support of the view that the Council’s transparency policy played a central role
in EU institutions’ attempt to advance their information ambitions. By strongly engaging with the issue of transparency
particularly the European Parliament and its members succeeded at expanding their institutional information basis in an
area where their political grip was traditionally at its weakest: the Foreign Affairs Council. Acting in turn as a bargaining
chip, a political lever, or an alternative to institutional information, the Foreign Affairs Council’s transparency policy was
thus clearly used to advance information agendas of oversight and legislative prerogatives.
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1. Introduction
In 2012, an applicant filed a case before the General
Court of the European Union to contest the Council’s de-
cision refusing access to parts of a document. The doc-
ument was a Council opinion concerning the legal basis
to be used for an agreement between the EU and the
United States concerning the so-called Terrorist Finance
Tracking Programme (SWIFT/TFTP) agreement, and the
applicant, Sophie in ‘t Veld, a member of the European
Parliament (MEP). Dissatisfied with the negotiation infor-
mation received internally via the European Parliament
(hereafter: Parliament), she decided to seek access to
the document in question via the public route.When the
General Court ruled in favour of most of In ‘t Veld’s pleas,
the Council appealed. An attendant at the public hearing
of the appeal case describes the following exchange be-
tween the Council’s legal counsel and a judge:
[So] the Council said, like: ‘It is very important that
that piece stays secret, because it’s very sensitive…’.
Then one…judge asked: ‘Yes, you say that secrecy is
needed to…protect the negotiations…’—[and] then
he clearly referred to ACTA [the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement]—‘[But] hasn’t it been shown that
exactly a lack of transparency is a threat to those ne-
gotiations?’ (respondent #1, interview April 17, 2014)
The Court of Justice subsequently upheld the initial
judgment.
The above-described episode stands out for a num-
ber of reasons. Although the law on access to documents
(Regulation 1049/2001) is intended for the broad pub-
lic, it was used by an institutional actor. And while insti-
tutional arrangements are in place for MEPs to receive
privileged information, In ‘t Veld still chose the public
access route. Moreover, she apparently received wider
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access as a citizen than the Council had initially been
willing to grant her in her capacity as an MEP. Finally,
both the applicant and the Court connected the issue
of transparency (i.e., access for the general public) with
the Parliament’s need of information in order to exercise
its right of assent (a matter of institutional politics). The
question may well be asked what caused this seemingly
unusual use of the transparency policy.
Up until now, transparency has been primarily re-
garded as a thermometer of the relation between
the Council of the EU and the public at large (e.g.
Curtin, 2013; Hillebrandt, Curtin, &Meijer, 2014; Maiani,
Pasquier, & Villeneuve, 2011; Novak, 2013). Relatively
limited attention has been devoted to the central role
that instruments play for the creation of public access
play in inter-institutional information politics. This is the
case even when much evidence suggests that in practice
transparency and inter-institutional information are con-
nected in various ways (e.g. Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004;
Reichard, 2013; Rosén, 2015). The fact that the Foreign
Affairs Council (FAC) represents something of an outlier
in the Council in terms of the stunted advance of trans-
parency is partially explained by the traditional norm of
limited transparency in the area of foreign policy (Curtin,
2013, p. 453; Hillebrandt, 2017; Puetter, 2014). Yet the
Council’s policy of limiting transparency in the area of for-
eign affairs makes it all the more puzzling that other in-
stitutions engage with it so extensively. The Parliament,
which experienced its own information limitations in in-
teractions with the Council, appears to have taken the
lead in this regard (Curtin, 2013, p. 445).
Recent scholarship highlights the diverse range
of informational arrangements that support inter-
institutional coordination in the European Union (EU),
and their shortcomings (see e.g. Abazi, 2016; Brandsma,
2013; Maurer, Kietz, & Völkel, 2005; Rosén, 2015). Some
of this academic work makes reference to the trans-
parency rules, yet it only does so in passing, maintaining
the focus primarily on information required for parlia-
mentary oversight. This article seeks to address this gap,
offering a structured analysis of the manner in which
transparency acts as a platform for institutional politics.
In particular, it argues that the Council’s transparency
policy has offered other institutions, notably the Parlia-
ment, the means to exercise significantly more influence
over the FAC than would otherwise have been possible.
Transparency has been used in turn as a lever, a bargain-
ing chip, or an alternative to institutional information
in ways that structurally rebalanced the institutional in-
formation relation between the FAC and the Parliament,
yet were largely unforeseen and unsolicited by the for-
mer. The article proceeds as follows. In the next section,
the concept of Council transparency and its role in insti-
tutional information politics is theoretically developed.
Section 3 offers an empirical account of the manner in
which FAC transparency’s three policy arenas enabled
or constrained the use of transparency as a ‘platform’.
Section 4 analyses the observed interactions between
transparency and institutional information politics in this
account in light of the theoretical framework. Section 5
concludes.
2. Council Transparency: Public Affair…and
Institutional Springboard
Transparency has been described as ‘the ability to look
clearly through the windows of an institution’ (De Boer,
1998). In the EU context, reality is more complex: be-
cause of the many institutions, the public may find it eas-
ier to see through some of the EU’s windows than others.
A parallel dynamic occurs in the information relations be-
tween the EU’s various institutions. Setting out from the
institutionalist notion that ‘information is power’ (Hall
& Taylor, 1996, p. 18), EU institutions are expected to
develop information strategies in order to increase their
influence on policy processes. Information struggles are
likely to be most acute in the relations between insti-
tutions acting as accountability forums and those per-
forming executive tasks (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017, in
this issue). Traditionally, the FAC makes up such an ex-
ecutive institution. As the Council’s formation charged
with foreign policy, it stands at the centre of strate-
gic non-legislative decision making representing mem-
ber states’ common interests (Puetter, 2014). Its increas-
ing engagement in the area of trade policy moreover has
made the FAC’s extensive reliance on secrecy a growing
source of contestation (Leino, 2017). This ambiguous po-
sition of the FAC reflects in the first place on its trans-
parency policy, but extends to the institutional environ-
ment within which it operates. While the transparency
literature has explained the development of the policy
public of access to Council documents with a consider-
able degree of detail (e.g. Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004; Hille-
brandt et al., 2014), the role that this policy played in
institutional politics, particularly that of the Parliament,
has remained underexposed.
Following an institutionalist perspective, this article
sets out from the assumption that developing FAC trans-
parency is perceived as a potential opportunity by the
EU’s primary political accountability forum, the Parlia-
ment, while being perceived as a risk by those institu-
tions forming part of the executive branch, namely the
European Commission (hereafter: Commission) and the
European External Action Service (EEAS). As a result, the
policy not only serves the public but also affects insti-
tutional dynamics. The central question in this article
is how institutions use their involvement in matters of
Council, more precisely FAC transparency policy for pur-
poses of advancing or protecting their own information
position. To this end, it is important to first outline the
manner in which Council transparency policy functions,
and what potential opportunities it affords as a spring-
board for institutional ambitions.
EU transparency has emerged as a distinct policywith
a range of instruments, with public access to documents
at its centre (Hillebrandt et al., 2014). An overarching
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legal framework makes each institution—including the
Council and, by default, its formation of the FAC—1 re-
sponsible for the disclosure of documents that it holds.
Transparency as a policy is constituted by its rules and
practices. Access to EU documents is governed by a cen-
tral legislative act, Regulation 1049/2001, which is speci-
fied and complemented by a number of lower-level rules.
The totality of rules stipulates under what conditions
and in what form the public gets access to FAC decision-
making information (e.g., where and howdocuments are
to be requested, how disclosure decisions can be ap-
pealed, etc.). These rules are subsequently implemented
in practice.
Like other policies, transparency is not only consti-
tutive, but also reflexive. The dynamics of rule-making
and implementation may lead the FAC to develop coping
strategies to maintain control over its information flows.
When such coping strategies solidify into routines, these
become informal norms regarding transparency (Helmke
& Levitsky, 2004). Where rules exist, sooner or later ac-
torswill contest their interpretation before a court. In the
case of the FAC, 16 cases were brought between 1994
and March 2017.2 Relative to other Council policy areas,
this number is very high, making up around 50 per cent
of all cases to which the Council was a party (Hillebrandt,
2017, pp. 215–216, 219–220). While the influence of ad-
judication must ultimately be deduced from the specific
content of the cases, these numbers do provide a first in-
dication of the centrality of rule interpretation in the FAC
(Derlén & Lindholm, 2014).
The various components of FAC transparency policy
are shaped in three contexts of structured interaction,
which are here referred to as ‘arenas’. Each of these are-
nas presents institutional actors with a distinct set of
opportunities and constraints for the advancement of
their information position. A closer understanding of the
decision-making dynamics in FAC transparency is there-
fore required to uncover the opportunity structure of in-
stitutional actors at particular points in time, and identify
the motives guiding their actions in these episodes. De-
pending on the dynamics of the arena, transparency pol-
icy may offer institutions seeking more institutional FAC
information a lever, a bargaining chip, or an alternative
to existing institutional information structures, while in-
stitutions seeking to limit such information sharing may
use it as either a brake or an obstacle requiring circum-
vention. Finally, arenas may also offer no platform for in-
stitutional politics at all.
The first arena is that of contestation internal to the
FAC. In this arena, member states with opposing views
on transparency confront each other over the adoption
and implementation of internal transparency rules (e.g.
Galloway, 2014). Member states have the final say in
political decisions, however the Council secretariat staff,
particularly when more senior, are able to press their
mark on the decision-making process (Christiansen &
Vanhoonacker, 2008). The implementation of the trans-
parency rules remains entirely within the hands of Coun-
cil officials and the secretariat staff (Bauer, 2004), who
may end up aligning transparency rules with their work-
ing routines through informal norms (Novak, 2013). In
short, themanagement of the internal administration re-
mains a firm FAC prerogative, leading to the expectation
that internal actors will seek to reduce institutional en-
croachment by treating transparency policy as a brake
or alternatively, by circumventing the rules to limit the
access of outsiders, including other institutions. At the
same time, the rules are capable of creating rights for
outsiders, a fact that extends to individuals from other
EU institutions, who are enabled by the rules to request
access to documents like any other EU citizen (Rossi &
Vinagre e Silva, 2017, p. 45). As such, the transparency
rules could come to form an alternative to institutional
information channels in a policy area like foreign affairs,
where such channels are limited.
In the second arena, the (Foreign Affairs) Council op-
erates as a unitary actor facing external political con-
testation. Such contestation may take different forms.
In legislative decision making, the Council shares rule-
making powers with the Parliament, with the Commis-
sion holding the right of initiative. The adoption of Reg-
ulation 1049/2001 can thus be said to reflect a com-
promise between Council and Parliament positions that
was accepted by the Commission (Bjurulf & Elgström,
2004). Inter-institutional manoeuvring of the Parliament
is also described in terms of its pursuit of extended pow-
ers (Buitenweg, 2016; Rosén & Stie, 2017, this issue).
The Parliament’s legislative positioning on transparency
might then be viewed as a means of expanding access
to Council information, a search for negotiating collat-
eral regarding (wider) parliamentary oversight arrange-
ments, or a way of exercising public pressure on the FAC
(Crisp, 2014; Rosén, 2015), turning transparency into re-
spectively an instrument of inter-institutional policy, a
bargaining chip, or a lever. Not only the Parliament seeks
to influence the FAC’s transparency policy; the Commis-
sion and the EEASmay in their turn be concerned that in-
formation (non-)disclosure by the FAC undermines their
exercise of executive functions (Reichard, 2013, p. 328).
The third, judicial arena covers a type of contes-
tation that is qualitatively different from the first two
arenas. Here, contestation is structured along juridical
lines. This means that it casts the (Foreign Affairs) Coun-
cil against a litigant in front of the Court of Justice, in
a legal conflict over the interpretation of formal trans-
parency rules that spills over from the first or second
arena. At an early stage, the legal avenue of adjudication
was found to be available to applicants in spite of the
1 Particular characteristics of transparency policy are generalisable to other EU institutions. Inside of the Council, the FAC forms only one out of several
policy formations. However, as the focus in this article lies on FAC transparency, hereafter reference is made exclusively to the FAC unless further
specification is required.
2 Namely, 14 actions against Council decisions to refuse access, and 2 actions contesting the legality of an adopted legal act. March 2017 marks the time
of this article’s submission.
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fact that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly
excluded jurisdiction for the Court of Justice in Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters (TEU, article
24(1), second indent). Other EU institutions may inter-
vene in transparency cases to advocate their own inter-
pretations of the rules in case, or bring an action contest-
ing the legality of an act. Member states have the same
prerogatives, meaning that conflicts in the judicial arena
can also emerge from purely ‘internal’ FAC conflict, and
‘mixed coalitions’ (Hillebrandt et al., 2014, p. 12). The
Court has a pertinent role in shaping the interpretation
of the rules governing access to FAC documents given
the large number of cases brought for adjudication,3 its
structuring capacity, and the finality of its rulings (Rossi
& Vinagre e Silva, 2017). Needless to say, court judg-
ments can lead to interpretations of the transparency
rules that either enhance or limit other institutions’ in-
formation position.
The three arenas provide an analytically rigorous
overview of the manner in which change in the FAC’s
transparency policy enables or constrains institutional
information politics (Table 1). In reality, policy dynam-
ics are of course far less orderly and structured. Con-
flicts between institutions may be played out at various
times in different arenas, or even in multiple arenas at
the same time. Therefore, though analytically distinct,
developments in each arena cannot be seen separately
from the others. For example, when the FAC adopts in-
ternal rules, it must stay within the parameters of inter-
institutionally agreed legislation, while its implementa-
tion of the rules may provoke court action. Similarly, con-
testation by external actors or court adjudication may
cause the FAC to revise its internal rules or develop ad-
ditional informal coping norms. As a consequence, FAC
transparency and institutional information politics are
closely interlinked. The following section traces the man-
ner in which the three arenas of FAC transparency policy
enabled or constrained other institutions’ ambitions re-
garding their information position.4
3. FAC Transparency Policy: Development in the Three
Arenas
A (Foreign Affairs) Council transparency policy5 began to
develop from 1993. It was shaped in different arenas of
policy making, shaping transparency both constitutively
and reflexively. This section offers an analytical descrip-
tion of themanner inwhich institutional actorswere able
to advance their information ambitions through their in-
volvement in FAC transparency.
3.1. The Internal Arena: From Rupture to Closure
The attitude of the FAC towards transparency has tra-
ditionally been marked by ‘exceptionalism’ (respondent
#13, interview September 12, 2014). From the beginning
and throughout, the Council’s transparency rules have
included the protection of ‘international relations’ as a
mandatory exception (Council, 1993, article 4(1), first in-
dent; subsequently, European Parliament and Council,
2001, article 4(1), third indent). In practice, the FAC relies
on this exception very frequently, resulting in an access
refusal rate that far exceeds the Council average (Hille-
brandt, 2017). The internal rules and their implementa-
tion soon cast member states against each other. Four
member states (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and
Sweden) frequently opposedwhat they considered to be
a too narrow application of the transparency rules (Hille-
brandt et al., 2014).
In 2000, the Council’s new Secretary-General and
High Representative for the CFSP Solana oversaw amajor
reform of the transparency rules. It was underpinned by
an emerging awareness of the need for a strong security
of information policy of which Solanawas a strong propo-
nent (respondent #17, interviewNovember 11, 2014). As
space precludes a detailed discussion of all changes, only
the most important are mentioned here.6 Importantly,
the reformed rules placed CFSP and Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP) documents outside of
Table 1. FAC transparency policy as a platform for institutional information politics.
Arena Policy component
Constitutive Reflexive
(rules, practices) (informal norms, court interpretation)
Internal Alternative (+), brake (−) Circumvention (−)
External political Alternative (+), bargaining chip (+), No effect
lever (+), brake (−)
External judicial No effect Alternative (+), brake (−)
3 Over the years, a total of more than 200 transparency disputes were adjudicated by the Court of Justice, see Rossi and Vinagre e Silva (2017, p. 1).
4 The empirical analysis is based on 20 expert interviews, a review of policy documents, EU rules and EU court judgments as well as quantitative datasets
of administrative appeals in access to document requests (N= 348) and documents placed on the online register compiled by the author. Details concer-
ning the interviews are provided at the end of the article.
5 See footnote 1.
6 See however Reichard (2013).
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the scope of the transparency rules (Council Secretary-
General, 2000),7 and introduced the so-called ‘orcon’
principle, according to which classified documents sup-
plied by third parties could not be disclosed without the
originator’s consent (Council Secretary-General, 2000, ar-
ticles 2(1)(a), 3(1) and 4). Solana was supported in his ef-
forts by the incumbent French Council presidency. Swe-
den, which held the next presidency, oversaw the rever-
sal of the outright exclusion of CFSP/CSDP documents,
but retained the ‘orcon’ principle in new internal secu-
rity rules of 2001 (Council, 2001a).
After the adoption of Regulation 1049/01 (see next
section), the rule framework around foreign policy ‘ex-
ceptionalism’ became further entrenched (respondents
#15, interview September 12, 2014, and #17, interview
November 11, 2014; Galloway, 2014), while internal po-
litical contestation declined. The Swedish rules of 2001
reversing the ‘Solana Decision’ were adopted with the
requirement of only a simple majority of Council mem-
bers, suggesting the emergence of a new political bal-
ance (United Kingdom Government, 2000a). The rules
have thereafter remained in place with only minor (un-
related) adjustments (Council, 2011, 2013). The Decision
of 2001 further foresaw in the establishment of a secu-
rity committee and security office, both of which were
in place by the end of the year (Council, 2001b, annex,
part II, section 1). The progressive expansion of the se-
curity regime occurred largely outside of the member
states’ involvement, being instead overseen by top of-
ficials from Solana’s cabinet (respondent #17, interview
November 11, 2014).
Once by 2001 the ‘exceptionalist consensus’ in the
FAC had been secured in the transparency rules, the
incidence of member state dissent in access refusals
plummeted. The (internal) depoliticisation of the trans-
parency question went accompanied by a ‘transparency
ceiling’. As the numbers of FAC documents placed on the
public register increased over time, the share of these
that were directly accessible actually declined by over 10
percentage points between 2002 and 2014. A likely even
larger number of documents is today not cited on the
register, making it practically impossible for outsiders to
know of their existence (Council, 2008, p. 1; Hillebrandt,
2017; respondents #10, interview September 10, 2014,
and #18, interview December 9, 2014). The circulation
of unnumbered and unregistered documents appears to
be particularly prevalent in the area of trade policy (re-
spondent #12, interview September 11, 2014).
3.2. The External Arena: Ever-Louder Knocking on the
Door
In terms of institutional interference in the FAC’s trans-
parency policy, the Parliament largely set the tone. The
Parliament’s institutional information rights as laid down
in the Treaties were initially rather limited (Reichard,
2013, p. 327), a situation that itwas keen to change (Mau-
rer et al., 2005; EP plenary, September 5, 2000, as cited
in Rosén, 2015, pp. 389, 391). On several occasions, indi-
vidual MEPs relied on public access to documents rules
to bring attention to the FAC’s secrecy or to provoke ad-
judication. In doing so, they were aided by their institu-
tional platform. For example, MEP Hautala was only able
to request access to a CFSP document because she had
first learned about its existence from the Council’s an-
swers to her parliamentary question. The document in
question had been discussed in an informal body and dis-
tributed via the closed-circuit diplomatic Coreu network
(European Parliament, 1997, p. 48; respondent #18, in-
terview December 9, 2014).
At the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, the Par-
liament coupled its influence in the negotiations on the
access to documents law foreseen by Article 255 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) (Am-
sterdam version) to the parliamentary access question
(Rosén, 2015, p. 389). It considered ongoing negotiations
on an inter-institutional agreement (IIA) regarding parlia-
mentary access to sensitive documents to progress in-
sufficiently. Faced with a closed-rank Council majority,
the Parliament’s protest against the ‘Solana Decision’ re-
mained ineffective (respondent #17, interview Novem-
ber 11, 2014; also Reichard, 2013, p. 331; United King-
dom Government, 2000b). Sustained pressure, however,
eventually began to work (see next section). While the
‘Solana Decision’ was initially deemed to form the basis
of the newRegulation onpublic access, onlymonths later
this position was revised (United Kingdom Government,
2000a, 2000b).
The Parliament’s involvement as a co-legislator
clearly strengthened its negotiating position, as it forced
the Council to accept a ‘grand bargain’ that included,
next to a compromise on Regulation 1049/01 regarding
public access to documents, the prospect of parliamen-
tary access to classified information in the short term
(Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004; Reichard, 2013, p. 340; respon-
dents #5, interview June 24, 2014, #8, interview Septem-
ber 4, 2014, and #18, interview December 9, 2014). The
conclusion of an IIA on access to classified CSDP informa-
tion eventually led the Parliament to tone down its advo-
cacy of greater transparency, as its previous misgivings
were now largely addressed (European Parliament and
Council, 2002; Rosén, 2015, pp. 392–394; respondents
#6, interview July 11, 2014, #11, interview September 11,
2014, and #13, interview September 12, 2014). A string
of parliamentary access to CFSP information agreements
subsequently ensued (European Parliament, 2010; Euro-
pean Parliament and Council, 2006; and most recently
European Parliament and Council, 2014).
In recent years, the basic paradigm of ‘exceptional-
ism’ becameagain challengedwhere the Council initiates
negotiations for international agreements. This is not in
the last place due to the Parliament’s growing Treaty
7 Earlier rules on classified information laid down in Council Decision 24/95 kept classified documents within the scope of access to documents. See
Council (1995), article 2.
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powers in this area (respondents #6, interview July 11,
2014, #11, interview September 11, 2014, and #13, in-
terview September 12, 2014). A new provision under the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
article 218(6) now grants it the right of either consent
or consultation in all international agreements except for
those falling exclusively within the CFSP. Furthermore, in
all international agreements, whether non-CFSP or CFSP,
a revised provision entails that the Parliament ‘shall be
immediately and fully information at all stages of the
procedure’ (TFEU article 218(10), addition relative to the
original Amsterdam TEC article 300(2) italicised). It soon
transpired that the Parliament did not hesitate to vote
down agreements when it was dissatisfied with either
the negotiating outcome or process (respondents #11,
interview September 11, 2014, #13, interview Septem-
ber 12, 2014).8 This change in the institutional balance
(along with widespread public protest) also proved capa-
ble of moving the Commission’s generally reluctant posi-
tion on transparency on at least one important occasion.
In June 2013, the FAC debated the possibility of publish-
ing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) negotiating mandate (a Council document). Even-
tually it maintained the document’s classification level at
‘restreint’ (respondents #3, interview June 3, 2014, and
#17, interview November 11, 2014). However, after a
group of over 250 NGOs in May 2014 submitted a pe-
tition calling on the EU to increase transparency of the
TTIP process, the Commission joined the chorus of critics
(Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017, in this issue). In October 2014
the Council gave in and disclosed the document (Crisp,
2014; Quintanilla, 2014).
Other executive bodies have aligned with the FAC’s
‘exceptionalist consensus’. For example High Represen-
tative (HR) Ashton, who in December 2009 was ap-
pointed as an independent actor at the head of the EEAS,
prioritised the protection of member state and third
party intelligence, although with certain institutional in-
novations (respondents #4, interview June 4, 2014, and
#17, interview November 11, 2014). For senior CFSP
meetings in the Council, a routine was developed by
which the Council Secretariat submitted a very summary
draft agenda, while the EEAS in parallel submitted an
annotated agenda directly to the member states, pre-
venting outsiders from having references to the docu-
ment’s underlying agenda items (respondent #12, inter-
view, September 11, 2014). The EEAS has also champi-
oned regular informal contact with individual member
states to limit information flows (respondents #10 inter-
view September 10, 2014, #12, interview September 11,
2014). Ashton largely followed the line of her predeces-
sor in this regard. For example, Solana personally com-
mitted to a revision of the transparency rules towards
NATO before the FAC had taken a decision on the matter
(Reichard, 2005, p. 333). The introduction of the ‘orcon’
principle paved the way for an eventual EU-NATO intel-
ligence agreement (EUR-Lex, 2003). In the years there-
after, the Council adopted similar agreements with over
20 other third parties, including Ukraine, Turkey, and
the UN (Council Secretariat, 2007; Galloway, 2014, p.
678). The resultant rise of orcon-protected documents
has vastly increased the power of these parties over FAC
transparency.9 In spite of constitutional guarantees pro-
tecting the principle of transparency (EUR-Lex, 2011, Ar-
ticle 4(2)), powerful intelligence partners such as the
United States exercise a de facto veto over disclosures
concerning documents to which it was a party (respon-
dent #1, interview April 17, 2014; also respondent #6, in-
terview July 11, 2014).
3.3. The Judicial Arena: Many Public Interests
In a relatively high number of cases, disputes over FAC
transparency, not in the last place concerning political
differences, ended up in the judicial arena. This is to an
important part due to the strongly legal orientation of EU
transparency, which affords wide opportunities for exter-
nal parties to litigate (Rossi & Vinagre e Silva, 2017).
The judicial arena stands out as the arena in which
the FAC has theweakest position. In contrast to the other
arenas where it enjoys respectively policy autonomy or
blocking power, in the judicial arena, the Court of Justice
has the final word. This observation is not as self-evident
as itmay seem. TheCouncil initially took the position that
the jurisdictional exclusion of the Court in CFSP matters
also applied to the question of access to documents in
this area (TEU, Maastricht version, article L; later TEU,
Amsterdam version, article 46). When MEP Hautala in
1998 brought a case before the Court of First Instance
(CFI)10 to seek annulment of the Council’s access refusal
(see previous section), the question of jurisdiction be-
came a point of law for the Court itself to answer (Hau-
tala v. Council, 1999, upheld upon appeal in Council v.
Hautala, 2001). As many as six out of fifteen member
states intervened,11 revealing a deep rift on this matter
within the FAC itself (Swedish Government, 1998). The
Court affirmed its jurisdiction and struck down the Coun-
cil refusal decision on grounds of proportionality. At the
same time, it established that it should not go beyond a
limited review that largely agreed with the Council’s ‘ex-
ceptionalist consensus’ (Hautala v. Council, 1999, para.
72; also Heliskoski & Leino, 2006, pp. 761–765). Conse-
quently, after the Hautala case no member state consid-
ered it necessary to intervene in an FAC-related trans-
parency case.
The Court’s ruling in the Hautala case set the tone
for a string of remarkably restrained judgments on FAC
transparency. In Kuijer I v. Council (2000), concerning
8 As was the case, inter alia, in 2010 with the SWIFT/TFTP and in 2012 with the ACTA.
9 A rough estimate on the basis of Bunyan (2014, pp. 3–4) suggests that the proportion of third-state documents classified restreint might be as high as
80 per cent or more.
10 The CFI was later renamed General Court by the Lisbon Treaty.
11 Namely France and Spain in support of the Council and Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom in support of Hautala.
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a CFSP report on asylum policy, WWF EPP v. Council
(2007), concerning documents about WTO negotiations,
and Besselink v. Council (2013), related to a draft man-
date for negotiations on EU accession to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the
Court systematically reaffirmed its ‘hands-off’ approach
towards the Council’s application of mandatory excep-
tion grounds of the access regulation resulting in a lim-
ited, strictly procedural review as established in Hau-
tala. Particularly relevant is the Sison case (Sison v. Coun-
cil, 2005, and appeal, Sison v. Council, 2007; see also
Abazi & Hillebrandt, 2015, p. 835; Heliskoski & Leino,
2006, p. 753), in which the Court arguably went be-
yond the CFSP’s original ‘exceptionalist consensus’ in pro-
tecting FAC confidentiality, by finding that the Council
was justified in providing only a very brief explanation
of this refusal (Sison v. Council, 2007, para. 82). This
raised questions about the Court’s permissive attitude
towards the Council’s seemingly arbitrary application of
the international relations exception (Heliskoski & Leino,
2006, p. 756).
Although the Court played a modest role in demar-
cating the interpretative room for the Council’s trans-
parency rules, external actors within the EU institutional
system saw chances to use litigation as a pressure instru-
ment. The negotiations around Regulation 1049/01 and
the IIA on parliamentary access to CSDP documents can-
not be fully understood without this pressure. Soon af-
ter the adoption of the ‘Solana Decision’ in 2000, both
member states and the Parliament began proceedings
against this Decision (respectively Netherlands v. Coun-
cil, case dropped, with interventions by Finland and Swe-
den, and European Parliament v. Council, case dropped).
Both caseswere clearly instigatedwith the primary objec-
tive of creating leverage over the Council in subsequent
negotiations. This is evidenced by internal doubts about
the cases’ viability, and the fact that the cases were with-
drawn once the desired result was in sight (respondent
#6; Rosén, 2015, p. 391). In the case of the Parliament,
the focus was foremost on its institutional access and
only indirectly on the transparency policy as such. This
explains why it initiated new proceedings over the trans-
parency rules after Regulation 1049/01 was adopted,
only to drop the case after an IIA was concluded (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2001, point 6; Rosén, 2015, p. 393).
In recent years, the Court has proven to be more re-
ceptive to parliamentary pressure on the FAC. This is epit-
omised by the In ‘t Veld case law which gave way to a
rather transparency-friendly doctrinal development (In
‘t Veld v. Council, 2012, and appeal, Council v. In ’t Veld,
2014, described in section 1 above). The Court’s review
of the Council’s refusal to grant access in this case re-
vealed a more transparency-friendly attitude than in ear-
lier foreign policy-related cases against the Council. This
change in position is likely to have been influenced by
the Court’s growing support for strengthening the Par-
liament’s right of institutional access, as evidenced in a
judgment related to another CFSP-related international
agreement handed down shortly before.12 The Court still
followed the review criteria set out in Hautala, but in-
terpreted them more strictly than it had done up un-
til then, insisting that the harm which would be caused
by disclosure must be ‘reasonably foreseeable and not
purely hypothetical’, and that to this end, such foresee-
able harmmust be set out in a sufficiently concrete man-
ner. This new interpretation strengthened Court review
of the international relations exception in all but name
(Abazi & Hillebrandt, 2015, p. 839). Departing from its le-
nient position in Sison (2007), the Court insisted that in
spite of the Council’s wide discretion to determine harm
to the protected interest, it ‘remained obliged’ to explain
the risk of harm in sufficient detail (Abazi & Hillebrandt,
2015, p. 837).
4. Institutional Information: (How) Does Transparency
Make a Difference?
The empirical account of the other EU institutions’ rela-
tion to the FAC’s three policy arenas reveals that trans-
parency forms an important platform uponwhich institu-
tional information politics is played out. Particularly the
Parliament actively engaged in the FAC’s transparency
policy in response to new executive structures, while the
policy offered the Court a growing role as arbiter of in-
stitutional interactions. Against this stood increasingly
unsuccessful attempts by the Council, the EEAS and the
Commission to resist the expansion of information shar-
ing both with the Parliament and with the public at large.
Through its engagement with the FAC’s transparency pol-
icy, the Parliament thus managed to expand its informa-
tion base. Expanded institutional information however
did not necessarily promote further transparency: both
the ‘orcon’ principle and IIAs conspired against public ac-
cess, in favour of closed-door parliamentary access.
4.1. New Executive Structures and a Growing Role for
the Parliament
Transparency policy in the FAC has been to a large ex-
tent structured by the post-Maastricht policy terrain of
the CFSP, and it was in this context that the Parliament
eventually began to use transparency policy as a plat-
form for expanding its information base. In doing so, it
was confronted with the Council‘s CFSP institutional ar-
chitecturewhichwas designed to ‘brake’ the influence of
transparency in this area. As the FAC turned into an intel-
ligence actor, third parties (e.g. NATO, the United States)
became stakeholders in the discussion in their capacity
of intelligence-sharer. The FAC had an interest in offering
strong guarantees of non-disclosurewhere these parties’
or member states’ intelligence was concerned, and con-
sequently leaned strongly towards secrecy in this mat-
ter, to the point where this acute awareness turned into
transparency circumvention. The other executive actors
12 The case European Parliament v. Council (‘Mauritius’), was delivered on June 24, 2014, 9 days before Council v. In ‘t Veld (2014).
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(EEAS, Commission) followed this line. In this regard, the
change, in 2009, of the HR from a Council insider to an
outsider was far from a hard transition.
Nevertheless, initially the FAC was internally divided
about the consequences of the ‘exceptionalist consen-
sus’ for transparency, which was most acutely visible
in the ‘policy battle’ over the reform of the classifica-
tion rules in 2000. By connecting the issue of trans-
parency with that of parliamentary oversight, the Par-
liament managed to use this conflict to its institutional
benefit, stepping up its demand for greater information
and oversight rights in the CFSP when this area began to
expand in the early 2000s. In doing so, it used its oppo-
sition against the classification rules and elements from
the transparency act for political leverage and bargain-
ing chips. Interestingly, the Parliament did not hesitate
to initiate court cases primarily to create further lever-
age. Meanwhile individual MEPs resorted to the public
access rules as an alternative to the underdeveloped in-
stitutional channels.
The Parliament’s involvement in FAC transparency
policy must thus be viewed as part of a wider struggle
for the expansion of its information base, in support of its
rights of oversight in the areas of CFSP and international
agreements negotiations. This reading is confirmed by
several actions. For example, the Parliament linked its co-
legislative role in the Regulation 1049/01 negotiation to
the issue of special information rights in the area of the
CSDP as a package deal, thereby creating synergies that
the Council majority preferred to avoid. It eventually se-
cured an IIA granting privileged access in 2002,whichwas
expanded in subsequent agreements with the Council.
Several years later, as the Parliament’s role in the
field of international negotiations was strengthened by
the Lisbon Treaty, it again sought a revision of the ‘excep-
tionalist consensus’. The Parliament’s willingness to play
institutional ‘high game’ was underlined by its decision
to vote down two international agreements and by In ‘t
Veld’s transparency litigation in relation to one of these.
This strategy, carried by the public controversy of the pro-
posed agreements and extended into the judicial arena
(see next section) now created political leverage over the
Commission, which led the international negotiations on
behalf of the EU. Aware of the increasing shadow cast by
the Parliament as a channel of public discontent and the
risk emanating from perceived secrecy, the Commission
shifted its position on transparency in the TTIP negotia-
tions, stepping up its own disclosure and calling upon the
FAC to do the same (Coremans, 2017, in this issue). Thus,
the Parliament successfully fomented its role in institu-
tional politics by coupling the issues of transparency and
institutional information politics.
While the Parliament’s involvement in FAC trans-
parency strengthened its hand in terms of its access
to FAC information, this did not necessarily lead to an
improvement in terms of transparency. After a settle-
ment was reached in 2002 that brought classified docu-
ments formally under the access rules and created par-
liamentary rights of access to classified CFSP informa-
tion, the Parliament removed its pressure, suggesting
that expanded (privileged) information had been the Par-
liament’s main concern from the start. In the years there-
after, no noticeable improvement could be observed in
the disclosure of FAC documents or the registration of
‘orcon’ or otherwise classified documents, in spite of
both practices being the norm under the transparency
rules (Hillebrandt, 2017, pp. 193, 229–230). The Parlia-
ment’s newly gained access thus formed a compromise
solution that had minimal impact on FAC transparency
policy itself.
4.2. The Court of Justice as Arbiter of Institutional
Interactions
The role of the Court in institutional politics is more com-
plex to gauge. As it is unable to determine either the tim-
ing, the volumeor the nature of disputes, its role remains
largely passive. This passive role was most extremely ap-
parent where actors used the judicial arena in order to
create leverage in their negotiations with the Council,
even without the Court’s interference. This occurred in
actions brought by the Netherlands (supported by Fin-
land and Sweden) in 2000 and the Parliament in 2000
and 2001. These actions were initiated for strategic rea-
sons, likely without the intention of being seen through
(and subsequently withdrawn), instrumentalising the ju-
dicial arena of FAC transparency policy beyond what was
theoretically expected.
In the majority of cases however litigation led to
a judgment, giving the Court the opportunity to inter-
vene as a ‘gatekeeper’ of the interpretation of the trans-
parency rules pertaining to the FAC.13 As an alternative
to institutional information channels, transparency court
actions were highly successful. Both litigatingMEPs were
given wider access through the courts’ interventions
(though with a delay of years), a considerably higher rate
than that of ‘ordinary’ applicants.14 Against this stood
the Council’s efforts at ‘braking’ these outsiders’ access,
which were increasingly unsuccessful.
Although the judicial arena thus accorded external
actors relatively good chances for challenging FAC se-
crecy, this does not in itself indicate the Court’s influ-
ence as an institution.15 Indeed, it generally followed a
rather restrictive procedural interpretation of its role, on
the ground that the Council acting as an executive body
should be allowed wide discretion. The Court did how-
ever exercise a significant influence on the interpretation
of the FAC’s transparency rules in two important areas.
13 The Court’s interventions were similar to transparency cases in other Council formations in this respect.
14 A total of 5 out of 9 litigants were givenwider access through the courts’ interventions (though oftenwith a delay of years). This represented two-thirds
of all FAC transparency cases, a proportion that increases to over three-quarters when only final rulings in appeal cases are counted.
15 This stands in contrast to the Court’s influence more generally, where the Court has considerably shaped the interpretation of Regulation 1049/01,
cf. Rossi and Vinagre e Silva (2017).
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First, it opened the door to the reliance on transparency
as an alternative channel for institutional access, by both
declaring the transparency rules applicable to the CFSP,
and itself competent to adjudicate on potential legal dis-
putes in this policy area. This was an interpretation of the
rules that severely undermined attempts by the Council
to put a brake on any spill-over effects. Second, in In ‘t
Veld, it interpreted the criteria applying to mandatory ex-
ception grounds to be stricter than had hitherto been
the case, thereby setting the bar higher for future ac-
cess applications. In doing so, the Court incidentally sup-
ported the Parliament’s judicial pressure on the FAC to of-
fer wider parliamentary information in international ne-
gotiation processes (as expressed in theMauritius case).
The Court’s involvementmay be seen as contributing
simultaneously to the advancement of transparency and
of parliamentary oversight, particularly as regards inter-
national agreements. By restricting the Council’s ability
to withhold information from the public, both the public
debate and the parliamentary control required for a func-
tioning democracy are enhanced. At the same time, it re-
mains to be seen how the Court’s rulings in this regard
will play out. For themoment, it appears that particularly
the Parliament has strengthened its (privileged) informa-
tion position under article 218(10) by demonstrating its
leverage as a blocking power.
5. Conclusion
The FAC has since long practiced a policy of transparency,
which is generally regarded as a means to improve its re-
lation with the general public. Less attention has been
devoted to the policy’s role in institutional politics. This
article has sought to address this gap, by highlighting the
ways in which institutional actors have engaged with FAC
transparency in order to advance their ambitions regard-
ing institutional information. It finds ample evidence in
support of the view that institutional information politics
was repeatedly played out in the FAC’s transparency pol-
icy. A particularly large role in this regard is reserved for
the Parliament, the Court, and strategic partners in intel-
ligence exchange.
The role of FAC transparency as a platform of insti-
tutional politics is notable at various levels cross-cutting
the three arenas. Whereas the Council initially sought
to restrict outsiders’ access to its foreign policy-related
information through internal rules, the Parliament’s co-
legislative role concerning transparency made this brak-
ing strategy increasingly unsuccessful. Not only did the
Parliament use the legislative process as a lever to es-
tablish minimal transparency standards for the FAC; it
also used its legislative role as a bargaining chip to en-
sure its first rule-based access to CSDP documents within
a reasonable timeframe. In terms of rule interpretation,
the Court ensured the possibility of judicially enforceable
FAC transparency, by finding itself competent to rule on
access to CFSP documents cases and, in In ‘t Veld, inter-
preted the Council’s duty of justification of an access re-
fusal in a way that de facto increased the overall thresh-
old for withholding information regarding international
negotiations. In ‘t VeldMEP’s decision to bring a casewas
directly related to the Parliament’s effort to ensure bet-
ter information and influence over the FAC’s formulation
of international negotiations policy. Yet the Parliament
also did not hesitate to begin judicial proceedingsmerely
as a way of creating leverage in ongoing negotiations.
The institutions’ influence on transparency imple-
mentation is less apparent. On the whole, the FAC re-
tained firm control over the internal process of docu-
ment disclosure. While the transparency regime indeed
offered MEPs an alternative route to the information
that they were seeking, there is scarce evidence that
the FAC sought to de-escalate individual information re-
quests in order to avoid a court ruling on transparency. At
the same time, EU institutions were generally either un-
able or unwilling to overturn the informal norm of shield-
ing third-party intelligence from the transparency rules,
thereby attempting to circumvent the pressures of insti-
tutional politics. On thismatter, the HR, the EEAS and the
Commission supported the FAC in prioritising the wishes
of third parties and member state over the transparency
rules, although the TTIP mandate episode reveals that
support for the latter was, at least discursively, limited.
From a constitutional perspective, the findings in this
article offer amixed picture. The FAC generally interacted
with the public and EU institutions on the basis of a self-
identity as an executive actor engaged in the creation of
both European policy and the coordination of national
policies. This perception, particularly dominant in CFSP
decision making, led to the reliance on a ‘exceptional-
ist consensus’: where the executive develops a foreign
policy in the interest of the community, both the public
and the Parliament must allow it wide discretion to op-
erate in secrecy. Here, the Parliament used transparency
policy as a platform to contest this view and to enhance
its information position. As the FAC became increasingly
engaged in concluding international agreements, partic-
ular in the (quasi-legislative) area of trade policy, the
‘exceptionalist consensus’ became more frequently chal-
lenged. There, the Parliament’s insistence on more elab-
orate oversight and the Court’s support for this position
clearly relied on the FAC´s transparency policy both as
an alternative to institutional information and a politi-
cal means of generating visibility. The Parliament’s in-
creased involvement led to two parallel ‘substitution pro-
cesses’: the introduction of (closed-door) parliamentary
information as a substitute for transparency on the one
hand, and that of information giving as a substitute for
accountability on the other. Both developments are con-
stitutionally problematic, as (closed-door) parliamentary
oversight cannot replace the constitutional principles of
transparency and accountability.
The findings presented in this article come with a
disclaimer. While strong evidence is found of a cen-
tral role for the FAC’s transparency policy as a plat-
form through which institutional information relations
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are shaped, it is not fully clear to what extent the pol-
icy forms either a necessary or a sufficient condition for
the developments described. Further research is there-
fore needed to clarify the FAC transparency policy’s in-
teraction with other factors in the wider constellation of
institutional dynamics.
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2. Member, Brussels-based NGO 14 May 2014
3. Staff member, Council Secretariat 3 June 2014
4. Academic, specialist CFSP 4 June 2014
5. Former senior member state representative, Brussels delegation 24 June 2014
6. Staff member, national ministry of foreign affairs 11 July 2014
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15. Staff member, Council Secretariat 12 September 2014
16. Senior staff member, Council Secretariat 12 September 2014
17. Former staff member, HR’s cabinet 11 November 2014
18. Member of the European Parliament 9 December 2014
19. Staff member, Council Secretariat 12 September 2014
20. Member state representative, Brussels delegation 11 November 2014
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